Lindenwood University

Digital Commons@Lindenwood University
Center for Economics and the Environment

The Hammond Institute for Free Enterprise

4-2005

Is Climate Change the 21st Century’s Most Urgent Environmental
Problem?
Indur M. Goklany

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lindenwood.edu/cee
Part of the Environmental Studies Commons

Is Climate Change the 21st Century’s
Most Urgent Environmental Problem?
by Indur M. Goklany

LINDENWOOD
Economic Policy Lecture
Series 7
April 2005

ISEE

Institute for Study of Economics
and the Environment

A unit of Lindenwood University’s Center for
the Study of American Culture and Values

This publication is an edited transcript of a talk by Dr. Indur M. Goklany presented
on September 28, 2004 in Lindenwood University’s Economic Policy Lecture Series. The lecture series is designed to engage students, faculty and off-campus guests
of Lindenwood University in discussion of key economic issues of the day. These
lectures are published in order to afford a variety of audiences across the nation the
opportunity to benefit from them.
The Institute for Study of Economics and the Environment (ISEE) directs the lecture series. This lecture was co-hosted with the Division of Management.
ISEE is a program of teaching and research at Lindenwood University. Its mission
is “to improve student and public understanding of the basic economic concepts that
can be used to guide effective and efficient environmental policy making.” The Institute operates within the National Center for the Study of American Culture and Values
at Lindenwood. Additional information on ISEE is available at:
http://www.lindenwood.edu/academics/isee/isee1.html
Funding for ISEE is unrestricted, ensuring unbiased and independent research. The
Institute is an integral part of Lindenwood University, which has been granted taxexempt status under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.
Donations can be made to the Institute for Study of Economics and the Environment
at the following address:
Institute for Study of Economics
and the Environment
Lindenwood University
209 South Kingshighway
St. Charles, MO 63301
Attn: Dr. Kenneth Chilton
Copyright © 2005 by the Institute for Study of Economics and the Environment,
Lindenwood University, St. Charles, MO. All rights reserved.

Is Climate Change the 21st Century’s
Most Urgent Environmental Problem?
Indur M. Goklany
INTRODUCTION
Some have argued that the Kyoto Protocol and other schemes for immediately
mitigating greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are justified because human-induced
global warming is, in the words of the 42nd U.S. President, William J. Clinton, “the
overriding environmental challenge” facing the globe today.1 Another argument,
advanced by those who are more cautious and perhaps less prone to hyperbole, is
that the impacts of global warming – on top of myriad other global public health and
environmental threats – may prove to be the proverbial “straw that broke the camel’s
back.” They suggest that climate change will overwhelm human and natural systems
by increasing the prevalence of climate-sensitive diseases, reducing agricultural productivity in developing countries, raising sea levels, and altering ecosystems, forests,
and biodiversity worldwide.2
In this paper, we first examine global warming impacts to date – the good, bad and
indifferent effects. We next analyze the impacts of global warming into the foreseeable further. Thirdly, we ask whether it is more effective to rely on mitigation (emission reduction) strategies, or on adaptation approaches to climate change impacts.
(In this analysis, “adaptation” implies measures, approaches, or strategies that would
help cope with, take advantage of, or reduce vulnerability to the impacts of global
warming.)

GLOBAL WARMING IMPACTS TO DATE
According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), over the last
century or more, the earth has warmed 0.4 to 0.8 oC, perhaps due in part to man’s
influence.3 Over this period, there have been changes in many climate-sensitive environmental indicators or sectors of the economy — some for the better, others for the
worse, and for others, neither better nor worse (good, bad and indifferent changes).

Indur M. Goklany, Ph.D. is an independent scholar with 30 years of experience in analyzing environmental and natural resource science and policy. His most recent book is
Economic Growth and the State of Humanity.
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The Good
For many critical climate-sensitive sectors and indicators, matters have actually improved, especially during the last half century.4 Global agricultural productivity has
never been greater, for instance.
An acre of cropland sustains about twice as many people today as it did in 1900, and
it sustains them better. Based on nutrition and affordability of food, people have never
been fed better or more cheaply. Between 1961 and 2001, global food supplies per
person increased 24 percent, although global population almost doubled.5 Between
1969-71 and 1998-2000, the number of people in developing countries suffering from
chronic hunger declined from 35 percent to 17 percent or, in absolute terms, from
917 million to 799 million despite a 79 percent growth in population in developing
countries.6
In wealthier countries, deaths due to climate-sensitive infectious and parasitic diseases are now the exception rather than the rule. Such deaths are declining in most
developing countries thanks to better nutrition and public-health measures. Accordingly, from 1960 to 2000, the global infant mortality rate dropped by 57 percent, and
global life expectancy at birth increased from 50.2 to 66.5 years.7 However, in the
last 10 to 15 years, these improving trends have been reversed in many sub-Saharan
African and former communist countries, not because of climate change, but because
of increasing poverty, AIDS, and malaria.8
Another climate change concern is that severe weather events could become more
extreme and, therefore, more destructive. Indeed, increased population and wealth
have put more people and property at risk. For example, this factor has contributed to
an increase in U.S. property losses from floods and hurricanes over the last century.
Significantly, there are no clear trends in losses in terms of the fraction of wealth that
these losses represent.9
More significant, based upon nine-year averages, U.S. death rates due to hurricanes,
tornados, floods, and lightning decreased between 60 and 99 percent, compared with
their earlier peaks during this century (overall deaths declined between 46 and 97
percent).10 Similarly, globally, the average deaths per year from climate and weather
related events declined by over 95 percent between the 1930s and 2000-2003, while
death rates declined overall by 98.5 percent (see Figure 1).11
The Bad
For other climate-sensitive indicators matters have, indeed, worsened. So far, however, human-caused warming has had little to do with these declines.
Consider sea level rise. Mean sea level is rising at a rate of about 0.1 to 0.2 mm per
year.12 While it is not known what fraction, if any, might be due to any human-caused
warming, the IPCC’s Science Assessment notes that there was no detectable acceleration of sea level rise during the 20th century.13 Suffice it to say, so far, any accelerated
sea level rise due to man-made warming is unlikely to have caused anything other
than a minor impact on human or natural systems compared to other environmental
stresses (such as development of coastlines, conversion of lands for aquaculture,
drainage for other human land uses, sediment diversion due to dam construction, con2

Figure 1. Global deaths and death rates from climate–related disasters (includes deaths from drought;
extreme temperature; famine; flood; slides; wave/surge; wild fires; wind storm), 1900–2003. Sources:
Emergency Disasters Data Base (2004), McEvedy & Jones (1978), and FAO (2004).

struction of seawalls, and subsidence owing to water, oil and gas extraction).14
Agricultural demand for water – probably the largest threat to freshwater species
– continues to increase.15 Meanwhile, threats to terrestrial biodiversity – primarily the conversion of habitat to agricultural uses16 – have not diminished. Forested
area declined by 124 million hectares (306 million acres) in tropical and subtropical
nations between 1990 and 2000.17 This decline, which occurred largely because increases in food demand outstripped increases in agricultural yields in those nations, is
unrelated to global warming. During the same period, forest cover in the rest of the
world (mainly wealthy nations) expanded by 28 million hectares (69 million acres)
primarily because technology-based, high yield agriculture has reduced the demand
for cropland in those countries.
The Indifferent
As the higher latitudes have become warmer, spring has arrived earlier since the
1960s. As a result, we observe “earlier breeding or first singing of birds, earlier arrival
of migrant birds, earlier appearance of butterflies, earlier choruses and spawning in
amphibians, earlier shooting and flowering of plants.18 This has been accompanied
by later arrival of autumn and autumn colours in some places.
A meta-analysis of trends for 99 species of birds, butterflies and alpine herbs, found
significant range shifts averaging 6.1 km per decade towards the poles.19 It also found
a significant mean advancement of spring events by 2.3 days per decade based on data
for 172 species of shrubs, herbs, trees, birds, butterflies and amphibians.20 Clearly,
there have been changes, but are these changes adverse?
The Finnish branch of the World Wildlife Fund notes, for example, that:
Thanks to the warming trend, the growing season has grown .... At the same time the spring
migration of birds, including finches, larks, wagtails, and swifts, has begun an average of ten
days earlier than before.
The warmer temperatures have brought new, more southerly species of butterflies to Finland.
Many existing types of butterflies have extended their habitats further north.21
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According to the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds, some birds in the U.K.
have also become more abundant, possibly due to milder winters.22 Similarly, the
ranges of 15 butterfly species in the U.K. have expanded substantially since the 1970s,
“almost certainly” because of warming (whether or not human-induced).23 Butterflies
also appear earlier in the year and some have been able to spawn an extra generation
during the summer. In addition, some moths, crickets and dragonflies have migrated
into the U.K. 24
With respect to vegetation, a study of the earliest flowering dates of 385 wildflower
species in the United Kingdom shows that on average they bloomed more than 4.5
days earlier in the 1990s compared to their 1954 to1990 average, with 16 percent
blooming significantly earlier, while 3 percent bloomed significantly later. One plant
bloomed fully 55 days earlier.25 Similarly, the ranges of flowering plants and mosses
seem to have expanded in the parts of Antarctica that have warmed.26 Soil invertebrates have also advanced with changes in vegetation.27
Obviously, warming (whether due to man’s activities or nature’s machinations)
seems to have a measurable impact on the distribution and abundance of species,
but it is far from clear whether these changes are beneficial or detrimental. More
importantly, the major current threats to species come from habitat modification and
loss, water diversions, and invasive species, perhaps in that order, rather from climate
change.
Summary
Despite any warming, by virtually any climate-sensitive measure of human wellbeing, human welfare has improved over the last century.28 While some credit for increasing agricultural and forest productivity is probably due to higher carbon dioxide
concentrations and higher wintertime temperatures, most of these improvements are
due to technological progress driven by market — and science — based economic
growth, technology, and trade.29 Such progress has also reduced human vulnerability
to the effects of climate change.30 As a result, technological progress has so far had a
greater impact on the climate-sensitive measures than has climate change itself.31
On the other hand, matters may actually have deteriorated for some climate-sensitive environmental indicators, such as the loss of habitat and forests, and threats to
biodiversity. However, so far, climate change (human-induced or not), while contributing to change, seems to be responsible for little, if any, of this deterioration.
On the basis of current evidence, it is difficult to sustain the notion that climate
change is the greatest threat to public health or the environment today. But what about
the future?
THE FUTURE WITH AND WITHOUT GLOBAL WARMING
How important is global warming, relative to other factors that might affect
public health and the environment into the “foreseeable future”? Table 1 puts climate
change impacts in perspective. This table is based, for the most part, on a set of im4

pact studies sponsored by the U.K. Department of Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs (DEFRA). Many of these studies have been incorporated into the IPCC’s 2001
Third Assessment Report (TAR). Because the DEFRA-sponsored assessments did not
provide an estimate of future forest cover in the absence of climate change, it was
necessary to rely on other studies reported by the IPCC for that estimate.
Analysts involved in the DEFRA studies recognized that socioeconomic projections
are “not credible” beyond the 2080s.32 Table 1, therefore, reflects this concession
to reality. Although the TAR states that between 1990 and 2100, global temperature
might increase from 1.4 to 5.8oC, it also notes that “on time scales of a few decades,
the current observed rate of warming...suggests that anthropogenic warming is likely
to lie in the range of 0.1 to 0.2oC per decade over the next few decades.”33
The scenarios employed in the DEFRA-sponsored impact assessments are based on
globally-averaged temperature increases of slightly more than 0.3oC per decade;34
therefore, they may overestimate likely impacts to the 2080s.
Column 3 in Table 1 provides estimates of various public health and environmental
risks, or factors related to those risks, under baseline conditions in the 2080s (i.e., in
the absence of global warming). Column 4 provides the changes in risks or risk-related factors in the 2080s due to the imposition of global warming, above and beyond
baseline conditions. Finally, column 5 provides estimates of reductions in total risks,
or risk-related factors, due to full implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, assuming
that the Protocol would reduce temperature change between 3 to 7 percent by 2100.35
The Kyoto Protocol, thus, would reduce the impacts of global warming by less than 7
percent for all risk categories except coastal flooding. For the latter, it is assumed that
the Protocol will decrease the impact of climate change by about three times that.36
The data in Table 1 indicate that:
• In the absence of warming, (that is, in the “baseline” case), global cereal production would increase by 123 percent — from 1,800 megatons in 1990 to 4,012
megatons in the 2080s — in response to the additional food demand of a larger
and wealthier global population37. Such an increase is plausible provided: 1)
agricultural technology continues to enhance productivity, 2) sufficient investments are made in the agricultural sector and related infrastructure, and 3) trade
continues to move food from surplus areas to deficit areas.38
Due to global warming, agricultural production may decline in poor countries,
but may increase in wealthy countries, resulting in a net decline in global production of 100 megatons to 160 megatons (i.e., 2 to 4 percent of total production in the absence of warming) in 2080. Thus, downturns in economic growth
(which would inhibit investments in the agriculture and infrastructure), slower
technological change, or less voluntary trade of food supplies are more likely
to create a future food crisis than any potential global warming.39 Notably, the
Kyoto Protocol would result in a marginal improvement in production of less
than 0.3% in the 2080s.
5
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2080s

2085

2050s-2080s

Water Resources(population
in countries where available
resources use >20%)

Global Forest Area

2080s

Year

Falciparum
Malaria (population at risk,
PAR)

Global Agricultural
(cereal) Production

ClimateSensitive
Sector/Indicator

decrease 25-30(+)% by 2050,
relative to 1990

6.46 billion, vs. 1.75 billion in
1990

8.82 billion at risk by the 2080s,
vs. 4.41 billion in 1990

4,012 million metric tons
(MMT), vs 1,800 MMT in 1990

Baseline (B) in the 2080s, includes impacts of environmental
problems other than climate
change

increase by 5%, relative to 1990

impact of PAR of -2.39 billion
to +1.06 billion (or -27.0% to
14.1%)

increase PAR by 0.26 to 0.32
billion (or 2.9% to 3.7%)

production would drop 2% to
4%; and could be substantially
redistributed from developing to
developed countries

Impacts of climate change
(∆CC) in the 2080s, on top of
the baseline

Impact/Effect

reduce the increase in global
forest area by 0.4%

impact total PAR from reducing
it by 1.0% to increasing it by
4.1%

reduce total PAR by 0.2% to
0.3%

increase net global production
by 0.1% to 0.3%

Impacts of Kyoto Protocol in 2080s, relative to
baseline+∆CC*

Table 1: Projected Climate Change Impact in the 2080s, Compared to Other Environmental & Public Health Problems
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unknown

2080s

Storms

unknown whether magnitudes
or frequencies of occurence
will increase or decrease in any
specific area

decline of 12% relative to 1990

increase PAR by 0.081 billion
(or 623%)

~40-41 cm (or 20 inches), relative to 1990

Impacts of climate change
(∆CC) in the 2080s, on top of
the baseline

Impact/Effect

unknown

reduce the decline by 0.8% ,
relative to 1990 level

reduce total PAR by 18.1%
(0.017 billion)

reduce SLR by <1.4 inches

Impacts of Kyoto Protocol in 2080s, relative to
baseline+∆CC*

*Assumes that the Kyoto Protocol, if implemented, would reduce climate change and its impacts by 7% by the late 21st Century. See text.

Sources: Parry et al. (1999) and IPCC (200lb) for agriculture; Arnell et al. (2002) and Goklany (2000), based on Solomon et al. (1996), for forest cover; Arnell et al. (2002) and IPCC (200lb) for
Falciparum malaria; Arnell et al. (2002) for coastal flooding; Arnell (1999) for water resources.

decline of 40% relative to
1990

2080s

Coastal Wetlands
(Area)

0.013 billion

Varies

2080s

2080s

Sea Level Rise (SLR)

Baseline (B) in the 2080s, includes impacts of environmental
problems other than climate
change

Costal Flooding (PAR)

Year

ClimateSensitive
Sector/Indicator

Table 1 (continue):

Table 1: Projected Climate Change Impact in the 2080s, Compared to Other Environmental & Public Health Problems

• The population at risk (PAR) from malaria, one of the most common and

dreaded climate-sensitive infectious diseases, might essentially double in the
absence of global warming, from 4.41 billion in 1990 to 8.82 billion in 2080.40
With global warming, the numbers at risk of contracting malaria might increase
by 0.26 to 0.32 billion in the 2080s (equivalent to an increase of between 2.9 and
3.7 percent over the 2080 baseline).41 However, an increase in the numbers at
risk does not necessarily translate into an increased number of cases of malaria,
or an increase in its prevalence.42 The Kyoto Protocol would reduce the total
numbers at risk of contracting malaria by less than 0.3 percent in the 2080s, as
well.

• The number of people living in countries which experience water stress (de-

fined as countries using more that 20 percent of their available water resources)
would increase from 1.75 billion in 1990 to 6.46 billion under the baseline (no
climate change) case in the 2080s.43 This number is projected to increase by
as much as 1.1 billion or possibly decrease by nearly 2.4 billion, depending on
the precise climate model employed to estimate future climate change.44 The
impact of the Kyoto Protocol for this risk category would be minimal into the
2080s, ranging from a 1 percent decrease in PAR to a 4 percent increase.

• Agricultural and other human needs may increase the demand on land, be-

cause (the world’s population will be larger and probably wealthier). In the
absence of warming, forest cover may decline by 25-30 percent by the middle
of this century, putting enormous pressure on global biodiversity.45 On the other
hand, if land use does not change after 1990, then by the 2080s global forest area
may increase 5 percent over 1990 levels due to global warming alone.46

• Sea level may rise about 40 cm from 1990 to 2080.47 As a result, the popula-

tion at risk of coastal flooding is expected to increase by 623 percent — from
0.013 billion under the baseline to 0.094 billion. The Kyoto Protocol could
reduce the total PAR from coastal flooding by about 18 percent. Sea level rise
could also lead to a loss of coastal wetlands, but such losses due to other human
activities are expected to dominate at least into the 2080s.

• It is unclear whether the frequencies and magnitudes of storms, such as tornados, hurricanes, and cyclones, will increase or decrease.48

Thus, with the exception of coastal flooding, the impacts of climate change into the
foreseeable future are secondary to the impacts of other agents of change built into the
baseline case. Moreover, for the most part, the impacts of global warming would seem
to be within the “noise level” of these baseline problems.
Consequently, stabilizing GHG concentrations immediately — even if feasible
— would, unfortunately, do little over the next several decades to solve the bulk of the
8

problems frequently invoked to justify actions to reduce humanity’s role in warming.
Land and water conversion will continue almost unabated, with little or no reduction
in the threats to forests, biodiversity, and carbon stores and sinks. Food production
would not be markedly increased or decreased. Populations at risk of malaria would
not be affected much, nor would the numbers of people at risk of water stress. The
reductions in risks due to the Kyoto Protocol would be relatively trivial, at least until
the 2080s, with respect to all risk categories — with the possible exception of coastal
flooding.
Nevertheless, climate change could be the proverbial “last straw”. Moreover, the
relatively large reductions in the population at risk from coastal flooding might arguably, by itself or in conjunction with reductions in other risk categories, justify the
Kyoto Protocol (or other mitigation schemes).
DEALING WITH GLOBAL WARMING IMPACTS ON THE ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC HEALTH
There are several approaches to address potential climate change impacts on climate-sensitive environmental and public health problems. Policy makers can: (1)
reduce the size of the “last straw” (reduce climate change), (2) reduce the cumulative
“load”, (3) increase resilience (strengthen the camel’s back), or (4) share the burden
(redistribute the load among more camels). These approaches need not be mutually
exclusive, of course.49
Focusing on the Last Straw
The most common approach is to focus almost exclusively on the last straw by reducing or eliminating it. This is equivalent to reducing or eliminating human contribution to climate change, i.e., mitigating greenhouse gasses (GHGs). However, as Table
1 shows, this would accomplish little except in the case of coastal flooding, because it
would leave untouched the major share of the total risk burden.
Reducing the Cumulative Burden
Another approach would be to lighten the total burden on the camel’s back before it
breaks. This is tantamount to reducing the cumulative environmental burden before
global warming causes significant and, possibly, irreparable damage.
Consider malaria, for instance. Under the first approach, mitigation, one would, at
most, reduce the population at risk from malaria in the 2080s by 2.9 to 3.7% (260 to
320 million people). Keep in mind that this is the maximum effect, achievable only if
all climate change impacts could be eliminated — an impossible mission. By contrast,
under the second approach, one would attempt to reduce the total PAR from malaria,
whether it was the 4.41 billion in 1990 or the projected 9.14 billion in the 2080s. This
approach has several advantages.
First, even a small reduction in the baseline population at risk (PAR without climate
change impacts) could provide greater aggregate public-health benefits, than would a
large reduction in the relatively minor increase in PAR due to climate change. Assum9

ing that annual cases and deaths due to malaria are proportional to the PAR, reducing
the base rate for malaria by a mere 0.3 percent per year between 1990 and 2085 would
compensate entirely for any increases due to climate change
Second, resources employed to reduce the base rate would provide substantial benefits to humanity decades before any significant benefits are realized from limiting
climate change. About one million Africans currently die from malaria every year.
This death toll can be cut in half at a cost of between $380 million to $1.25 billion.50
Humanity would be better served if such sums were spent now to reduce malaria in
the near future, rather than on limiting climate change only to curb a relatively minor
share of the potential increase in malaria decades from now. Moreover, the benefits of
reducing malaria in Africa today are real and far more certain than any benefits resulting from eliminating climate change.
Third, the technologies developed and public-health measures implemented to
reduce the base rate would themselves serve to limit additional cases due to climate
change when, and if, they occur
Fourth, reducing the baseline rate would serve as an insurance policy against adverse impacts of climate change, whether that change is due to anthropogenic or natural causes or if the changes occur more rapidly than currently projected. In effect, by
reducing the baseline today, one would also help solve the cumulative malaria problem
of tomorrow, regardless of its cause.
Fifth, because of the inertia of the climate system, it is unrealistic to think that future
climate change could be completely eliminated. Moreover, the difficulties in ratifying
the Kyoto Protocol because of its socioeconomic impacts, indicates that even a freeze
in emissions is unrealistic, despite the fact that such a freeze would not halt further
climate change.
The logic of reducing the cumulative burden applies to other climate-sensitive problems and sectors where factors unrelated to climate change are expected to dominate
for the next several decades. As the data in Table 1 indicate, these problems and sectors
include agriculture, food security, water, forests, ecosystems, and biodiversity.
Increasing Resilience and Reducing Vulnerability
Yet another approach to dealing with the last straw is to strengthen the camel’s back
to enable it to carry a heavier load. This calls for policies that improve resilience and
reduce vulnerability.
It is generally acknowledged that poorer countries have the greatest vulnerability
to climate change, not because their climates are expected to change the most, but
because they lack the resources to adapt adequately to change. But their expected difficulty of coping with climate change is only one manifestation of a deeper overarching
problem, namely poverty.
If we look around at the world today, we find that almost every indicator of human or environmental well-being improves with wealth (see Figure 2).51 This is
true whether or not the indicator is climate-sensitive. Poorer countries have less food
available per capita (they are hungrier and more malnourished); their air and water are
more polluted; and they have poorer access to education, sanitation and safe water.
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Because they are more prone to death and disease from malaria and other infectious
and parasitic diseases, they have higher mortality rates and lower life expectancies.52
Citizens of developing nations are more vulnerable to any adversity because they
lack the fiscal and human-capital resources needed to create, acquire, and use new
and existing technologies to cope with that adversity. As a consequence, economic
growth, by enhancing technological change, would make society more resilient and
less vulnerable to adversity in general, and to climate change in particular.
Focusing on enhancing economic growth should be complemented by efforts to bolster the institutions that underpin society’s ability and desire to develop, improve, and
utilize newer and cleaner technologies. These institutions include providing greater
protections for property rights and contracts, enforcing the rule of law, providing honest and accountable government and bureaucracies, and supporting freer and open
trade.53

Figure 2. Human well-being vs. economic development, 1990s. Source: Goklany,
“Affluence, Technology and Well-being,” Case Western Reserve Law Review 53:
369-390 (2002).
Sharing the Burden
Climate change might create regional winners and losers. In particular, it could
redistribute agricultural production, with developing countries producing less and
developed countries producing more. That would aggravate the problem of hunger in
the former.
However, imbalances in production are not a new problem. Nor is a new solution
needed. Currently, poor countries consume about 10 percent more grain than they produce.54 Their future dependence on food imports might increase because their demand
for food is expected to grow faster than their agricultural productivity. Such imbalances have traditionally been solved, by and large, through trade. Freer trade would
work just as well in the future whether the imbalance is caused by climate change or
another factor.
11

In effect, trade is akin to helping solve the problem of the “last straw” by sharing the
burden amongst more camels. However, developing countries would need the wherewithal to purchase food surpluses produced elsewhere. This is yet another reason for
increasing economic growth, particularly in the non-food sectors of poor countries.55
MITIGATION OR ADAPTATION?
In 2010, the cost of the Kyoto Protocol to the developed countries for whom the
Protocol was designed is estimated at between 0.1 and 2.0 percent of their cumulative
GDP.56 Let us assume that the cost be 0.5 percent of their combined GDP. Using
their combined GDP for 2000 as an example, Kyoto’s costs would have amounted to
$125 billion in 1995 U.S. dollars.57 By the 2080s, net benefits from these expenditures
would include a reduction of only 17 million (17 percent) in the population at risk
from coastal flooding. For the other climate sensitive risk categories listed in Table 1,
however, the Protocol’s benefits would be trivial compared to the increase in baseline
PARs.
By contrast, the cost of stabilizing GHG concentrations would be greater, but so
would the benefits. Stabilization at 450 ppm (20 percent higher than current levels),
for instance, is estimated to cost a few trillion dollars between now and the end of the
century. Despite the considerable costs, and regardless of which mitigation regime
is imposed, the formidable baseline problems indicated in Table 1 would be virtually
undiminished for all risk categories except coastal flooding. Moreover, one should
expect that some residual impacts of global warming would persist.
Interestingly, some studies suggest that temperature increases of the order of 1-2oC
might, in fact, result in net benefits for agricultural and timber production.58 Consistent with these assessments, the IPCC report also suggests that a small (1-2oC)
increase might possibly produce a net economic benefit to the world but an increase
in excess of 2oC could have negative economic consequences.59 Therefore, the costs
of any mitigation may have to be shouldered for several decades before one can be
confident that they would create net benefits. This problem is magnified because of
the inertia of the climate system, which magnifies the time lag between when emissions reductions are initiated, and noticeable effects on the impacts of global warming
would be observed.
On the other hand, instead of mitigation-based approaches, we could employ a set of
adaptation strategies based upon principles two through four outlined above for dealing with the last straw, and targeted to each of the risk categories in Table 1. These
strategies would enhance adaptability and/or reduce vulnerability to both the impacts
of warming and the other global changes included in the baseline. They also would
have the added advantage that the benefits would be observed sooner after the costs
were experienced. For example:
• The global cost estimate for protecting against a 50 cm sea level rise by 2100 is
about $1 billion a year,60 or less than 0.005 percent of the overall global economic
product.60 Compared to the Protocol and any other mitigation approach, this is
orders of magnitude cheaper, and would also provide greater reductions in the PAR
from coastal flooding into the 2080s and beyond.
12

• Over a period of 95 years, a 20 percent increase in global agricultural research

funding, (which in the mid-1990s stood at $33 billion per year including $12 billion
in developing countries) ought to more than erase the entire 4 percent reduction in
agricultural production due to global warming.61 This would be substantially more
than the trivial portion that the Protocol would restore.
• No less important, to the extent the additional research funding increases sustainable agricultural productivity beyond the quantity needed to replace the shortfall, it
would reduce the human demand for land. In fact, increasing agricultural productivity would not only reduce conversion of wild land to new cropland, but it could
return existing cropland back to nature. Increasing agricultural productivity is the
single most effective method of preventing habitat loss and fragmentation, and conserving global forests, terrestrial biodiversity and carbon stocks and sinks.62
• Similarly, the above increases in agricultural research, if targeted appropriately,
would also help to increase the amount of food that can be produced by one unit of
water. Because agriculture is responsible for 85 percent of the freshwater consumed
globally, each 1 percent reduction in agricultural water consumption allows consumption for other sectors to increase by 5.7 percent. This would not only reduce
the population at risk from water stress but also would decrease pressures on fresh
water species.
• Annual expenditures of between $380 million and the $1.25 billion could reduce
the current death toll from malaria by 50 percent or, about 1 million people per year
according to the World Health Organization. This would be far more effective in reducing death and disease from malaria than either full implementation of the Kyoto
Protocol or even halting climate change altogether. As previously noted, methods
developed to prevent or treat baseline malaria problems (that is, problems resulting
in the absence of global warming) can be used to address similar problems resulting
from climate change.
Thus, over the next 75 years, the above set of adaptation measures would cumulatively cost much less, and deliver greater benefits, than either the Kyoto Protocol or
other more ambitious mitigation schemes.
Advocates of immediate greenhouse gas controls, might argue, however, that regardless of the urgency of climate change during the next several decades, unless
GHG emission reductions commence now those reductions may come too late to do
any good. They claim the inertia of the climate and energy systems argue for immediate action.
Certainly we would want to take all “no-regrets” actions — actions that produce
added benefits greater then added costs, after accounting for opportunity costs.63 But
as the data displayed in Table 1 indicate, even if it takes 50 years to completely replace
existing energy systems with new ones, we could nevertheless wait 25 years or more
before initiating heroic measures to control greenhouse gas emissions.64
Meanwhile, we could implement the strategies outlined above, which would deliver
benefits for people living today, while enhancing our ability to address future problems
that climate change may cause or exacerbate. These strategies could be complemented
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by developing more cost-effective mitigation and adaptation technologies that could
be implemented when they are needed.
CONCLUSION
Assessments of present-day and future impacts of human-induced climate change
indicate that it is not now, nor is it likely to be in the foreseeable future (i.e., into
the 2080s), as significant as other environmental and public health problems facing
the globe. Nevertheless, it has been argued, global warming could be the proverbial
“straw that broke the camel’s back,” particularly for natural ecosystems and biodiversity.
But there is more than one way to solve the problem posed by the “last straw.” Reducing or eliminating the last straw — reducing or eliminating climate change — does
little good, however, if the camel’s back bends or breaks in the meantime. Instead of
focusing just on the last straw — the camel’s back may also be saved more economically in other ways.
A better approach is to reduce today’s urgent public health and environmental threats
(such as malaria, water stress, hunger, and habitat loss) that might be exacerbated by
climate change. As we have seen, this would provide greater, more cost-effective and
quicker benefits to both humanity and the rest of nature.
We should also strengthen the camel’s back so that it can withstand a heavier burden, regardless of how or why the load is generated. The basic reasons as to why some
societies are less resilient and more vulnerable to climate change effects are precisely
the same reasons why they are also less resilient and more vulnerable to adversity,
in general — they have insufficient economic development and a lower propensity
towards technological change.65
Not surprisingly, poorer countries with less ability to develop, afford, and use new
technologies have higher rates of hunger; poorer public health services; greater incidence of infectious and parasitic diseases; less access to education, safe water and
sanitation. Therefore, they have greater mortality rates and lower life expectancies.
Accordingly, we should strengthen the institutions that drive both economic growth
and technological change. Not coincidentally, many of these institutions nurture, foster and reinforce each other. This approach would enhance these societies’ abilities to
cope not only with climate change, but adversity in general, regardless of its cause, or
whether it’s man-made or not.66
In addition, we should make it possible to share the burden among numerous “camels”. Because climate change would create regional winners and losers, the burden
could be spread more evenly through trade. Thus, shortfalls in agricultural production
induced by climate change in some countries could be addressed through trade with
others that would experience gains in agricultural production. Trade, moreover, has
the added benefits of stimulating both economic growth and technological change.
It particular, it allows societies everywhere to gain from innovations and inventions
made elsewhere in the world, without having to “reinvent wheels.”67
14

Policies based on these alternative approaches, all of which rely on improving
adaptability and reducing vulnerability, are superior to the single-minded pursuit of
reductions in climate change, at least into the foreseeable future. Into the 2080s, they
would provide greater benefits, far sooner and far more economically than would be
achieved by efforts which focus on mitigation.
Indeed, by reducing vulnerability and increasing adaptability, we might increase
the level to which greenhouse gas concentrations might rise before they need to be
stabilized in order to avoid dangers to humanity and nature (the stated goal of the UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change). This would further reduce the costs of
addressing climate change.68
Despite the inertia inherent in both the climate and energy systems, we have at least
two to three decades before we need to embark on socially and economically costly
efforts to reduce GHG emissions that would go beyond “no-regrets” actions.69 In the
interim, we should focus on:
1) solving today’s urgent problems while creating the means to address future
potential problems due to climate change
2) improving our understanding of the impacts of climate change so that we
can distinguish between the possible and the probable
3) increasing information regarding the trade-offs and synergies between adaptation and mitigation
4) reducing barriers to implementing no-regret technologies, whether they are
related to mitigation or adaptation (such as eliminating needless subsidies for
energy and natural resource uses)
5) undertaking efforts to expand the portfolio of no-regret actions70 through
greater R&D into more cost-effective mitigation and adaptation technologies.
Such a multifaceted and holistic approach would help improve the lives of people
living today, without compromising our ability to address future challenges, whether
caused by human-induced climate change, another agent of global change, or something else entirely.
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